Electronically Filed
6/13/2019 3:22 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PATRICK LEE O’NEIL,

)
) No. 46496-2018
)
Petitioner-Appellant,
) Bannock County Case No.
v.
) CV-2017-5047
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BANNOCK
________________________
HONORABLE ROBERT C. NAFTZ
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

BEN P. McGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1
Nature Of The Case..............................................................................................................1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ...................................................1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................5
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................6
O’Neil Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion
For Counsel And The Summary Dismissal Of His Petition Because
His Petition Did Not Show The Possibility Of A Valid Claim............................................6
A.

Introduction ..............................................................................................................6

B.

Standard Of Review .................................................................................................7

C.

O’Neil Has Not Shown That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying His Request For Appointment Of
Counsel ....................................................................................................................7
1.

Allegations That Raynee Myler “Perjured Herself”
And The Prosecutor Presented “False Testimony”
Thereby ......................................................................................................10
a.

Reference To December, 2015 Parole Violation ...........................12

b.

Reference To Drug Trafficking......................................................13

c.

Withholding Information Regarding UA Testing ..........................13

d.

Statement Regarding Meetings To Establish
Social Security Benefits .................................................................14

e.

Allegation That The Prosecutor Presented
False Testimony .............................................................................15

i

2.

D.

Allegation That Prosecutor Withheld Information
Regarding Wood Court ..............................................................................16

O’Neil’s Allegations Cannot Be Reimagined As Possibly
Valid Claims For Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel ............................................20

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................24

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Andrus v. State, 164 Idaho 565, 433 P.3d 665 (Ct. App. 2019) ..................................................... 7
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988) ................................................................ 20
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ...................................................................................18, 19
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) .......................................................... 7
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 978 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1999) .................................................. 20
Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1989).................................................... 20
Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882, 876 P.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1994) ..................................................... 23
Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 718 P.2d 283 (1986) .................................................................. 20
Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 254 P.3d 69 (Ct. App. 2011) .................................................. 22
Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct. App. 2014) ................................................ 11, 16
Green v. State, 160 Idaho 657, 377 P.3d 1120 (Ct. App. 2016) ..................................................... 7
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................. 11
Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 214 P.3d 668 (Ct. App. 2009) ......................................................8, 9
Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 218 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009) ............................................................... 6
Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 223 P.3d 281 (2009) ................................................................ 7, 8
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014) ................................................................... 7
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ......................................................................................... 11
Nelson v. State, 157 Idaho 847, 340 P.3d 1163 (Ct. App. 2014).................................................. 11
O’Neil v. State, Opinion No. 40120, 2013 WL 6094343 (Idaho App. Nov. 20, 2013) .................21
Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 227 P.3d 925 (2010) ................................................................. 10
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1994) ....................................................20

iii

Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001) ........................................................................ 10
Shackelford v. State, 160 Idaho 317, 372 P.3d 372 (2016) ...................................................... 7, 10
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999) .............................................................. 22
State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 761 P.2d 1239 (Ct. App. 1988) ........................................................ 9
State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 399 P.3d 804 (2017) ............................................................... 18
State v. O’Neil, Unpublished Opinion No. 640 (Idaho App. Nov. 8, 2017)....................... 2, 20, 22
State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 14 P.3d 388 (Ct. App. 2000) .......................................................... 18
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 233 P.3d 1286 (Ct. App. 2010) ............................................... 11
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 (2008) ............................................................... 22
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ........................................................................... 20
Thumm v. State, No. 45290, 2019 WL 848061 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2019) .................................. 18, 19
United States v. Berger, 976 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ........................................................ 18
United States v. Houston, 648 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................. 11
United States v. Nix, No. 208CR00283RCJPAL6, 2017 WL 2960520
(D. Nev. July 11, 2017) ..................................................................................................... 18
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007).................................................................8
STATUTES
I.C. § 19-4901 ................................................................................................................................. 8
I.C. § 19-4902(a) ............................................................................................................................. 8
OTHER AUTHORITIES
iCourt Portal, State v. O’Neil, Bannock County Magistrate Court,
Case No. CR-2015-16958 ................................................................................................. 13

iv

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Patrick Lee O’Neil appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. He asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for
counsel.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In May of 2016, Patrick Lee O’Neil pled guilty to two counts of delivery of a controlled
substance (heroin and methamphetamine). (R., pp. 41-44.) He was sentenced on August 15,
2016. (R., pp. 51-54.) The district court imposed unified, concurrent terms of twelve years with
five years fixed. (R., pp. 5, 86. 1) At the same time, it suspended the sentence and placed O’Neil
on supervised probation for a period of seven years. (R., p. 52.) In addition to other conditions
of probation, O’Neil was required to “participate in and successfully complete the Bannock
County Problem Solving Court.” (Id.) He did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and
sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)
The district court subsequently received a Report of Probation Violation. (R., pp. 59-60.)
The report―authored by Raynee Myler, O’Neil’s probation officer associated with his probation
in the underlying criminal case (R., pp. 56-58), and his parole officer associated with his parole
from a 2011 conviction for grand theft by possession of stolen property (R., pp. 10-12)―stated

1

Confusingly, the Minute Entry & Judgment of Conviction in the record reflects a “unified term
of 10 years of which five years are fixed with a subsequent indeterminate term of seven years on
each count to run concurrently.” (R., p. 52.) But there is no dispute that O’Neil was sentenced to
concurrent terms of five years fixed and seven indeterminate. (R., pp. 5, 32.) That is also the
sentence that the district court later re-instated after revoking O’Neil’s probation. (R., pp. 6265.)
1

that O’Neil “has admitted to and tested presumptive positive for methamphetamines six times
since October 7, 2016,” he admitted to using drugs, and he failed to report for required drug
testing (R., p. 57). He was therefore “officially terminated from the Bannock County Diversion
Court on Wednesday November 30, 2016, for failure to follow program rules.” (Id.)
O’Neil repeatedly admitted the allegations in the Report of Probation Violation and
accepted the recommendation that he be terminated from the Problem Solving Court. (R., pp.
59-60, 62.) Based on that admission, the district court found that O’Neil violated the terms of his
probation. (Id.) On February 17, 2017, after a disposition hearing, the district court concluded
that O’Neil’s “conduct and actions in violating the terms and conditions of probation require a
conclusion that [he] is no longer entitled to the privilege afforded him by the Court’s granting of
probation in this case.” (R., p. 63.) The district court therefore revoked his probation, re-instated
his sentence, and remanded him into custody. (R., pp. 63-64.)
O’Neil then filed a direct appeal arguing that the district court abused its discretion in
revoking his probation and re-instating the underlying sentence, which argument the Court of
Appeals rejected. State v. O’Neil, Unpublished Opinion No. 640 (Idaho App. Nov. 8, 2017).
On December 22, 2017, O’Neil filed a petition for post-conviction relief with supporting
affidavit. (R., pp. 5-27.) The petition included a request that counsel be appointed to represent
him. (R., p.23. 2) It purports to assert five broad claims as bases for relief:
(a) ineffective counsel from John Souza and Craig Parrish (attached)

2

The petition states that, if he desires that an attorney be appointed, he must “fill out a Motion
for the Appointment of Counsel and supporting affidavit, as well as a Motion and Affidavit fee
waiver.” (R., p. 23.) If he did so, that motion is not in the record. While he later requested an
attorney in association with two attempts to appeal, they did not seek appointment of postconviction counsel. (R., pp. 71-79, 104-11.) However, the district court considered that O’Neil
had properly requested post-conviction counsel and ruled on the request. (R., pp. 88-91.)
2

(b) Raynee Myler perjured herself multiple times, threatened me and was my
neighbor (attached)
(c) prosecutor used false testimony that he/she knew or had reason to believe was
false (attached)
(d) my plea was induced by promises that were not kept
(e) police/prosecution witheld favorable information from the defense.
(R., p. 6 (verbatim).) He identified the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel as involving the
allegations that:
(a) John Souza hates me for refusing to lie for his then client Derek Sanders (Ex
#5 transcripts involving my claim)
(b) Craig Parrish promised me nothing more than a rider would be argued for by
prosecution
(c) He promised me a full discovery even went as far to tell me he put it on my
property
(d) advised me P.O could be changed because she was my neighbor
(R., p. 23 (verbatim).)
O’Neil identified the relief he was seeking as, “To be re-sentenced with retained
jurisdiction and/or reduced sentence (like prosecution said he wasn’t against) to be considered in
light of new developments. An opportunity for new trial w/new counsel.” (R., p. 24 (verbatim).)
In his supporting affidavit, O’Neil alleged that Ms. Myler: (1) incorrectly stated that he
had been convicted of drug trafficking (R., p. 7); (2) incorrectly stated that he was subject to a
parole violation in December of 2015 (id.); (3) omitted various facts regarding one occasion on
which he was drug tested (R., p. 8); and, (4) made misrepresentations regarding her attempts to
assist O’Neil to establish Social Security benefits (R., pp. 13-14).
He alleged that the prosecutor “used false testimony that he/she knew or had reason to
believe was false. (by allowing Myler to say whatever she felt instead of what she knew.)” (R.,
p. 19 (verbatim).) He also alleged that the prosecutor “withheld fact that upon my entry into
program there was no exclusive medical provider for participants and when there was talk of it

3

the first place spoke of (before free clinic) failed to make successful agreement with Wood
Court.” (R., p. 21 (verbatim). ----See also R., p. 20 (“Myler spoke of having free clinic as a Wood
Court provider, she and prosecution both knew upon my entry into program there was only talk
of exclusive provider. So I was left with no help but later received 2 of 5 meds from free clinic
as that was all they would do for me” (verbatim)).
Finally, he alleged that his attorney, Craig Parrish, made inaccurate representations
regarding his plea agreement, and that the “Police/prosecution” withheld the identities of certain
informants from the defense. (R., p. 21.)
The state answered (R., pp. 28-30), and filed a motion for summary dismissal (R., pp. 6667), brief in support (R., pp. 31-40), and supporting exhibits (R., pp. 41-65). The state argued
primarily that O’Neil’s claims were untimely because they challenged only the conviction and
sentence. (R., pp. 38-39.) It also argued that O’Neil had waived claims that could have been but
were not raised in a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence, or in his appeal from the
revocation of his probation. (R., p. 39.) Last, the state argued that O’Neil’s allegations were
conclusory, unsupported, and did not state cognizable post-conviction claims. (Id.)
O’Neil did not respond to the motion for summary dismissal, but instead filed an appeal
prior to the district court ruling on the state’s motion. (R., pp. 71-74.) That appeal was
dismissed for lack of any appealable judgment. (R., pp. 80-83.)
The district court entered an order denying O’Neil’s request for appointment of counsel
and dismissing his petition. (R., pp. 85-103.) It found that O’Neil failed to raise even the
possibility of a valid claim because he was attacking the underlying conviction and sentence,
which claims were untimely. (R., pp. 98-102.) O’Neil timely appealed. (R., pp. 104-07.)

4

ISSUE
O’Neil states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. O’Neil’s
motion for appointment of counsel, because some of the issues in the
petition are related to the revocation of probation and therefore timely?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has O’Neil failed to establish that the district court erred when it denied his motion for
appointment of counsel because his pleadings did not show the possibility of a valid claim?

5

ARGUMENT
O’Neil Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion For Counsel And The Summary
Dismissal Of His Petition Because His Petition Did Not Show The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that O’Neil’s claims were frivolous, denied the motion for

appointment of counsel on that basis, and summarily dismissed his petition. (R., pp. 85-103.) It
did so based on its conclusion that the claims were untimely because O’Neil was challenging
only his judgment and sentence. (R., pp. 98-102.) O’Neil argues on appeal that the district court
erred because some of his claims “relate to the revocation of probation, not the original
conviction and sentencing,” and were therefore timely. (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) He identifies
three such issues, each involving an allegation that the state presented false testimony or
“withheld” information. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.) He claims that: (1) Raynee Myler, his
parole/probation officer, made false statements or withheld certain information; (2) the
prosecutor knowingly put on false testimony by permitting Ms. Myler to address the district court
at the disposition hearing; and, (3) the prosecution withheld information regarding the Bannock
County Problem Solving Court (Wood Court). (Id.)
O’Neil’s argument fails to establish that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his request for appointment of counsel and dismissed his petition. 3 The district court
correctly concluded that O’Neil’s petition does not show the possibility of a valid claim. O’Neil

3

O’Neil does not directly challenge the summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims. But
the state concedes that if O’Neil was entitled to be represented by appointed counsel, he was
entitled to that representation prior to summary dismissal of his claims. Conversely, because
“the threshold showing that is necessary in order to gain appointment of counsel [is] considerably
lower than that which is necessary to avoid summary dismissal of a petition,” Judd v. State, 148
Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009), if the district court properly concluded O’Neil’s
claims did not merit appointment of counsel, they were properly dismissed.
6

does not dispute that many of his allegations are untimely. Even the issues that he argues are
timely because they concern the revocation of his probation are either wholly unrelated to the
revocation of his probation, are at best only tangentially so, or directly conflict with the record.
The claims on which O’Neil focuses on appeal, like the claims that he acknowledges are
untimely, are frivolous. This Court should therefore affirm.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the

discretion of the district court.” Green v. State, 160 Idaho 657, 658, 377 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Ct.
App. 2016).

“Although the appointment of counsel is discretionary, counsel ‘should’ be

appointed when there is the possibility of a valid claim; failure to do so is an abuse of
discretion.” Andrus v. State, 164 Idaho 565, 433 P.3d 665, 669 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 393, 327 P.3d 365, 369 (2014)).
C.

O’Neil Has Not Shown That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying His
Request For Appointment Of Counsel
“‘The standard for determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent petitioner in a

post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid
claim.’” Shackelford v. State, 160 Idaho 317, 325, 372 P.3d 372, 380 (2016) (quoting Murphy,
156 Idaho at 393, 327 P.3d at 369). “In determining whether the appointment of counsel would
be appropriate, ‘every inference must run in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is
unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary
facts.’” Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 342, 223 P.3d 281, 284 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 794, 102 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2004)). To determine whether a petitioner has
raised the possibility of a valid claim, the Court considers “whether the appointment of counsel
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would have assisted him in conducting an investigation into facts not in the record and whether a
reasonable person with adequate means would have been willing to retain counsel to conduct that
further investigation into the claim.” Melton, 148 Idaho at 342, 223 P.3d at 284. If the claims in
the petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they could be
developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the
court may deny the request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809
(2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 2009).
The application of these standards to the facts of this case shows that the district court
properly denied O’Neil’s request for appointment of counsel. Each of O’Neil’s claims is either
an untimely challenge to his conviction and sentence or, even if an attempt at a timely challenge
to the revocation of his probation, is so tangentially related to the revocation of his probation as
to be patently frivolous.
There is no dispute that O’Neil attempted to assert untimely claims related to his
conviction and sentence. 4 He alleged, for example, that his attorney was ineffective because he
made false promises about the plea agreement (R., p. 23), that his guilty plea was induced by
those false promises (R., p. 6), that his attorney “promised a full discovery” (R., p. 23), and that

4

Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. I.C.
§ 19-4901, et seq. Under Idaho Code § 19-4902(a), to be timely, a post-conviction proceeding
must be commenced by filing a petition “any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the
time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings
following an appeal, whichever is later.” The district court in the underlying criminal case
entered the initial judgment of conviction and sentenced O’Neil on August 15, 2016. (R., pp. 5154.) O’Neil did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.)
To assert any claim for post-conviction relief related to his judgment and sentence, O’Neil had to
do so before September 26, 2017. O’Neil’s petition was stamped as filed by the district court on
December 22, 2017 (R., p. 5), and was signed by O’Neil on December 18, 2017 (R., p. 22).
8

the prosecution withheld the identities of certain informants (R., p. 21). The district court
properly concluded that many of O’Neil’s claims are untimely and therefore not even possibly
valid. See Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 686, 214 P.3d 668, 672 (Ct. App. 2009) (untimely
claims are frivolous and not possibly valid). O’Neil does not argue otherwise on appeal.
Thus, this appeal concerns only the issues that O’Neil argues are timely because they are
addressed to the revocation of his probation. In particular, he points to allegations that Raynee
Myler, his parole/probation officer, made various misrepresentations, that the prosecutor
wrongfully permitted her to do so, and that the prosecutor withheld certain information regarding
the nature of the Bannock County Problem Solving Court (Wood Court). (Appellant’s brief, pp.
13-16). That is, he argues that his petition alleges that the state presented false evidence and
withheld favorable evidence in relation to the revocation of his probation.
The allegations identified by O’Neil as concerning the revocation of his probation in fact
have little or nothing to do with it. “In a probation revocation proceeding two questions are
posed: (1) Did the probationer violate the terms of his probation? (2) If so, does the violation
justify revoking the probation?” State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 888, 761 P.2d 1239, 1240 (Ct.
App. 1988). O’Neil admitted his probation violations (R., pp. 59-60, 62), and does not challenge
those admissions on appeal.

Based on those admissions, the district court concluded that

O’Neil’s “actions in violating the terms and conditions of probation require a conclusion that
[he] is no longer entitled to the privilege afforded him by the Court’s granting of probation in this
case.” (R., pp. 63-64.) The alleged misrepresentations by Ms. Myler, as well as the information
allegedly “withheld” by the state, are unrelated to the remaining question whether those
violations justify revoking probation.

Only one of the alleged misrepresentations is even

remotely related to the disposition hearing and there is no reasonable possibility that any affected

9

that proceeding. The information allegedly withheld by the prosecution was more available to
O’Neil than to the prosecution and, by O’Neil’s own admission, was discussed at the disposition
hearing. Even if the Court construes the allegations as “concerning” the revocation of his
probation, so as to be timely, the claims are patently frivolous and do not give rise to the
possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. This Court should affirm. 5
1.

Allegations That Raynee Myler “Perjured Herself” And The Prosecutor Presented
“False Testimony” Thereby

O’Neil claims that his parole/probation officer, Raynee Myler, “‘perjured herself multiple
times.’” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-14 (quoting R., p. 6).) He points to four instances of alleged
perjury. First, he claims that Ms. Myler mistakenly reported a parole violation in December of
2015. (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) Second, he claims that she incorrectly stated that he was
convicted of drug trafficking. (Id.) Third, he claims that she “contacted his treatment facility
about having the facility UA him, and he failed one of the four administered tests.” (Id.) Fourth,
he claims that she made “comments about setting up many appointments for him to get his social
security,” while in fact she “only set up one appointment, which was premature.” (Appellant’s

5

In addition to arguing that O’Neil’s claims are untimely, the state argued below that they should
be dismissed as conclusory, as unsupported by admissible evidence, as lacking in any legal
support, and as “not cognizable under the UPCPA.” (R., pp. 36-37, 39.) If this Court determines
that some of O’Neil’s claims are timely, it can nevertheless affirm the district court on that
alternative basis. See Shackelford, 160 Idaho at 326, 372 P.3d at 381 (“[Petitioner] failed to raise
the possibility of a valid claim, so any error by the district court [in dismissing the petition and
denying request for appointment of counsel] could not have been significant enough to warrant
reversal. [Petitioner’s] substantial rights were not violated by any alleged error so I.R.C.P. 61
requires the Court to disregard the error.”); Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676-77, 227 P.3d
925, 930-31 (2010) (noting that “[w]here the lower court reaches the correct result, albeit by
reliance on an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory,” and
affirming summary dismissal of post-conviction claims on alternative basis); Row v. State, 135
Idaho 573, 579-80, 21 P.3d 895, 901-02 (2001) (holding that, though district court erred in
dismissing petition for the reason it did, dismissal was nevertheless appropriate on alternative
grounds raised below).
10

brief, pp. 14-15.) O’Neil further claims that the “‘Prosecutor used false testimony that he/she
knew or had reason to believe was false. (by allowing Myler to say whatever she felt instead of
what she knew).’” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16 (quoting R., p. 19).)
“In the context of post-conviction relief, the applicant bears the burden not only to prove
a constitutional violation, but also to demonstrate that he suffered some resulting prejudice that
would entitle him to relief.” Nelson v. State, 157 Idaho 847, 856, 340 P.3d 1163, 1172 (Ct. App.
2014). “The State cannot convict a person with testimony known to be false or allow the
testimony to go uncorrected.” State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368, 233 P.3d 1286, 1290 (Ct.
App. 2010) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). “A defendant establishes
a Napue violation upon showing: (1) the testimony was false; (2) the prosecutor knew or should
have known it was false; and (3) the testimony was material.” Id. Testimony or evidence is
material just in case there is a “‘reasonable likelihood’” that it affected the outcome of the
proceeding. United States v. Houston, 648 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hayes v.
Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005)).
There is no reasonable likelihood that any of the “testimony” identified by O’Neil
affected the outcome of the proceeding. Indeed, only the allegation that Ms. Myler represented
the number of meetings she arranged to establish O’Neil’s Social Security benefits had anything
to do with the revocation proceedings, and only tangentially so.

Even setting aside the

conclusory nature of O’Neil’s allegations that the relevant representations were false and the
prosecutor was aware or should have been aware that they were, see Grant v. State, 156 Idaho
598, 606, 329 P.3d 380, 388 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that conclusory allegations did not give
rise to even the possibility of a valid claim), the alleged misrepresentations were immaterial to
the revocation proceeding. They do not show the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim.

11

a.

Reference To December, 2015 Parole Violation

O’Neil claims that Ms. Myler incorrectly stated that he had a parole violation in
December of 2015. (R., p. 7.) In support, he attached a Report of Parole Violation authored by
Ms. Myler, which states that there was such a violation. (R., p. 11.) That Report of Parole
Violation was related to O’Neil’s parole from a 2011 conviction for “Grand Theft by Possession
of Stolen Property” (R., p. 10), and is distinct from the Report of Probation Violation that was
also authored by Ms. Myler and concerns the probation violations that gave rise to the revocation
of his probation in the underlying case (R., pp. 56-58). Though O’Neil attached the Report of
Parole Violation to his petition to support the claim that Ms. Myler made a misrepresentation
regarding a December 2015 parole violation (R., pp. 11-12), there is nothing to suggest that this
Report of Parole Violation was submitted to or considered by the district court in the underlying
criminal case.
Nevertheless, the Report of Probation Violation―which was considered by the district
court (R., p. 63)―likewise includes an off-hand reference to a parole violation in December of
2015 (R., p. 57). Regardless of the accuracy of the claim, a parole violation pre-dating the
charges and conviction in the underlying criminal case (see R., p. 31 (noting that charges were
filed on January 6, 2016)) is wholly unrelated and immaterial to the much-later probation
violations to which O’Neil admitted and the revocation of his probation based on those probation
violations. O’Neil presented no evidence suggesting that the state or the district court relied in
any way on the allegedly incorrect statement that O’Neil violated his parole in 2015. O’Neil’s
claim that the revocation of his probation was based on a false assertion that he committed a
relatively minor parole violation years earlier is frivolous.

12

b.

Reference To Drug Trafficking

O’Neil claims that Ms. Myler incorrectly stated that he was convicted of “drug
trafficking” on August 15, 2016. (R., p. 7.) Again, O’Neil is apparently referring to the Report
of Parole Violation to substantiate this claim, not the Report of Probation Violation that the
district court considered. The Report of Parole Violation states: “On July 9, 2015, Patrick O’Neil
was charged with two counts of Delivery of a Controlled Substance. On November 29, 2015,
Patrick O’Neil was charged with Drug Trafficking, Marijuana. Mr. O’Neil was convicted of
these crimes on August 15, 2016.” (R., p. 10.) By “these crimes” Ms. Myler apparently meant
the two counts of Delivery of a Controlled Substance, of which O’Neil was convicted on August
15, 2016 in the underlying criminal case. (R., pp. 51-54.) O’Neil was charged with trafficking in
marijuana, just as Ms. Myler states, but it appears that that charge was dismissed by the
prosecutor in January of 2016. iCourt Portal, State v. O’Neil, Bannock County Magistrate Court,
Case No. CR-2015-16958.
Again, though, the district court revoked O’Neil’s probation based on violations to which
he admitted and that occurred well after August 15, 2016. Even if the Report of Parole Violation
mistakenly suggests that O’Neil was convicted of trafficking in marijuana at the same time he
was convicted in the underlying criminal case, and even if, contrary to fact, there was some
reason to believe, or even an allegation, that the district court considered the Report of Parole
Violation, the statement has nothing to do with the revocation of O’Neil’s probation. O’Neil’s
claim based on this allegation is likewise frivolous.
c.

Withholding Information Regarding UA Testing

O’Neil relates an occasion on which he was drug tested at Ms. Myler’s request, suggests
that the occasion demonstrates that Ms. Myler was “unprofessional” and “vindictive[]” towards
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him, and suggests that she perjured herself by “omitting.” (R., pp. 8-9.) On the occasion in
question, as related by O’Neil, he initially tested positive, and then tested “clean.” (Id.) He does
not explain when the occasion occurred, to whom Ms. Myler should have related it, or why. Nor
does O’Neil cite any law on appeal to suggest that Ms. Myler “perjured” herself by failing to
volunteer the information, at some unstated time and for some unstated reason. The allegation is
wholly immaterial to the revocation of his probation. Whether Ms. Myler was “unprofessional”
towards O’Neil on this occasion has nothing to do with his admitted probation violations, nor
does Ms. Myler’s attitude toward O’Neil on this occasion in any way mitigate those violations or
suggest that the revocation of his probation was not warranted. Though nothing in the account
suggests that Ms. Myler was unprofessional or vindictive towards O’Neil on this or any other
occasion, whether she was or not is immaterial to the revocation of his probation.
d.

Statement Regarding Meetings To Establish Social Security Benefits

Finally, O’Neil alleges that Ms. Myler made a misrepresentation regarding his attempts to
secure Social Security benefits. (R., pp. 13-14.) He quotes Ms. Myler as stating that: “‘I set up
many appointments for [O’Neil] to actually attend to our payee through Gateway to get social
security set-up because he didn’t have it set-up at all.’” (R., p. 13 (quoting R., p. 15 (Tr., p. 40,
Ls.10-16)).) According to O’Neil, Ms. Myler did make an appointment for him to establish
Social Security benefits, but he was told when he attended that the appointment was premature.
(Id.) There is some inconsistency between Ms. Myler’s statement and his own only if O’Neil is
read as asserting that Ms. Myler made one and only one appointment for him to establish his
Social Security benefits, and even then the alleged misrepresentation involves only the number of
appointments she made for him. (Id. (claiming that Ms. Myler made “one appointment,” while
quoting Ms. Myler as stating that she made “‘many appointments’”).)
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O’Neil does not explain how the number of appointments Ms. Myler arranged for him to
establish Social Security benefits is in any way relevant to the district court’s decision to revoke
his probation. According to O’Neil, his counselor at Wood Court, Tazmin Cleaver, testified “at
length” that “Wood Court was a bad fit” for him, that they “weren’t ready for [him],” and he
“was not appropriately medicated for more than 75% of time in Wood Court.” (R., p. 19.) That
is, O’Neil apparently attempted to argue that his probation violations were mitigated, or that they
did not warrant revocation of his probation, because of alleged inadequacies at Wood Court,
including the failure to ensure he was adequately medicated. As reflected in the short portion of
a transcript in the record, the district court’s interest in O’Neil’s Social Security benefits
concerned whether the benefits could have been used to pay for his medications. (R., p. 15 (Tr.,
p. 40, Ls.17-25).) Ms. Myler responded that she did not know and turned her attention to other
means by which O’Neil could have secured his medications. (Id.)
At best, then, O’Neil’s Social Security benefits were relevant as a potential alternative
means by which O’Neil could have secured his medications. But Ms. Myler specifically stated
that she did not know whether they could have been used in that way. No reasonable person with
adequate means would have been willing to retain counsel to investigate a post-conviction claim
based on the allegation that, while Ms. Myler stated that she made multiple appointments for
O’Neil to establish Social Security benefits, she in fact made only one such appointment. That is
particularly so when the Social Security benefits were at best tangentially related to the probation
violations.
e.

Allegation That The Prosecutor Presented False Testimony

O’Neil claims that the “‘Prosecutor used false testimony that he/she knew or had reason
to believe was false. (by allowing Myler to say whatever she felt instead of what she knew).’”
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(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16 (quoting R., p. 19).) The only allegations of “false testimony” are
those discussed above. As discussed above, none of them provides a basis for post-conviction
relief. But for the alleged misrepresentation regarding meetings to establish Social Security
benefits, they are wholly unrelated to the disposition hearing or the revocation of O’Neil’s
probation.

Even that allegation is only tangentially related to the disposition hearing, is

immaterial to the district court’s determination to revoke O’Neil’s probation, and does not show
the possibility of a valid claim.
O’Neil’s allegation that the prosecutor “had reason to believe” that Ms. Myler made
misrepresentations is also conclusory and implausible. See Grant, 156 Idaho at 606, 329 P.3d at
388 (holding that conclusory allegations were properly dismissed as failing to raise even the
possibility of a valid claim).

The prosecutor had no reason to know that the first three

representations were even made, much less that they were misrepresentations: two occur in a
Report of Parole Violation that there is no reason to believe would have been before the district
court or the prosecutor, while another involves Ms. Myler “omitting” to provide certain
information regarding an occasion on which O’Neil passed a drug test, which occasion was not
(and there is no reason to believe should have been) addressed at the disposition hearing. The
final instance of allegedly “false testimony” concerned only the inconsequential issue how many
appointments Ms. Myler attempted to make to help O’Neil secure Social Security benefits, and
there is nothing to suggest that the prosecutor knew or should have known that she made one
appointment and not several.
2.

Allegation That Prosecutor Withheld Information Regarding Wood Court

O’Neil argues that his affidavit raises the possibility of a valid claim because, “Mr.
O’Neil’s petition and the supporting affidavits supplied information that there was no exclusive
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medical provider for Wood Court, and he was not appropriately medicated in most of his time in
Wood Court.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) He claims that “prosecution witheld [sic] fact that
upon my entry into program there was no exclusive medical provider for participants and when
there was talk of it the first place spoke of (before free clinic) failed to make successful
agreement with Wood Court.” (R., p. 21 (verbatim). See also R., p.20 (“Myler spoke of having
free clinic as Wood Court provider, she and prosecution both knew upon my entry into program
there was only talk of exclusive provider. So I was left with no help but later received 2 of 5
meds from free clinic as that was all they would do for me.”).)
The complaint here seems to be that, prior to his entrance into the Wood Court program,
there was “talk” (by some unnamed person or people) of access to an “exclusive medical
provider,” which talk turned out to be inaccurate when he entered the program. So read, the
allegation does not concern the revocation of O’Neil’s probation, but is directed to his plea
agreement, sentencing, and/or placement in probation. O’Neil appears to believe that his
placement in a diversionary program required access to an “exclusive medical provider,” which it
did not have. The suggestion is that he did not get the benefit of his plea agreement, or someone
reneged on a promise regarding his probation, because he did not have such access. If that is
O’Neil’s allegation, the complaint has nothing to do with the revocation of his probation and is
an untimely attack on his conviction and sentence.
Alternatively, O’Neil might be read as alleging that, quite apart from any representations
regarding the Wood Court program made prior to his entry into that program, the prosecution
withheld certain information at the disposition hearing regarding alleged deficiencies in the
program, which deficiencies would have mitigated his probation violations, making revocation of
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his probation unjustified. If that is the allegation, it conflicts directly with the record and is
unsupported by any case law.
So understood, O’Neil is most charitably read as asserting that the prosecutor committed
a Brady violation. “The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963),] that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused, upon
request, violates due process where the evidence is material to either the guilt or punishment of
the accused, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Thumm v. State, No.
45290, 2019 WL 848061, at *14 (Idaho Feb. 22, 2019). See also State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68,
72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000) (“A defendant’s due process rights are violated where the
prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). “Evidence is material for
purposes of a due process analysis if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of the
undisclosed evidence would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceeding.” Thumm,
2019 WL 848061, at *14. See also State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 503, 399 P.3d 804, 830
(2017) (“‘Reasonable probability of a different result is shown when the suppression undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial.” (internal quotation omitted)).
But O’Neil does not argue or cite any case law to suggest that Brady applies in the
context of a probation revocation hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Berger, 976 F. Supp. 947,
950 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that appellant “cited no authority for applying Brady to
a probation revocation proceeding and there is law to the contrary”); United States v. Nix, No.
208CR00283RCJPAL6, 2017 WL 2960520, at *2 (D. Nev. July 11, 2017) (holding that
“while Brady applies to prosecutors in the guilt phase of criminal proceedings, the Probation
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Office is not a prosecutor and supervised release revocation hearings are not criminal
prosecutions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Even if Brady does apply in the context of a probation revocation hearing, the allegations
in O’Neil’s petition do not raise the possibility of a valid Brady claim.
Any alleged inadequacies in the Wood Court program were as available, in fact, more
available, to O’Neil than to the prosecutor. The prosecutor cannot have improperly withheld
information that O’Neil possessed. See Thumm, 2019 WL 848061, at *14 (“Thumm cannot
establish a Brady violation since the defense was aware of the existence of the exculpatory
evidence and had the ability to obtain it, because under such circumstances, the evidence cannot
be considered to have been ‘suppressed’ by the State.”).
In fact, O’Neil himself claims that the alleged inadequacies of Wood Court were in fact
raised by him before the district court. He alleges that Tazmin Cleaver, his counselor at Wood
Court, addressed the court “at length” and stated that “Wood Court was a bad fit” for him, that
they “weren’t ready for [him],” and he “was not appropriately medicated for more than 75% of
time in Wood Court.” (R., p. 19.) O’Neil also addressed the district court. (R., p. 63.) While
only a small portion of the transcript from the disposition hearing is in the record, even that small
portion shows that O’Neil discussed his dissatisfaction with Wood Court. (R., p. 15 (Tr., p. 37,
L.2 – p. 39, L.12).) The prosecution could not have “withheld” information from the district
court when O’Neil himself presented that information to the district court.
Nor is there a reasonable probability that disclosure of the allegedly undisclosed evidence
would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceeding. That is obviously so because, as
just noted, the allegedly undisclosed evidence was presented to the district court by O’Neil. The
district court nevertheless revoked O’Neil’s probation, re-instated the underlying sentence, and
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the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. O’Neil, Unpublished Opinion No. 640 (Idaho App. Nov.
8, 2017).
D.

O’Neil’s Allegations Cannot Be Reimagined As Possibly Valid Claims For Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate

both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a
prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 649, 873
P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). An attorney’s performance is not constitutionally deficient unless
it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v.
State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger
v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245 (Ct. App. 1999).
O’Neil argues on appeal that he “allege[s] facts raising the possibility of a valid claim that
counsel was ineffective for not addressing Officer Myler’s lies during her comments or her bias
against Mr. O’Neil, or for not addressing the prosecution’s use of false testimony or withholding
of favorable information.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) For two reasons, that argument fails.
First, as O’Neil acknowledges, he does not allege that his counsel was ineffective, that his
counsel failed to do those things, or that the failure was prejudicial. (Appellant’s brief, p. 18
(“Even though Mr. O’Neil did not raise those particular ineffective assistance of counsel claims
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in his petition, he may not have raised them because he, as a pro se petitioner without legal
training, was unable to properly articulate those claims.”).) He argues that, in light of his pro se
status, this Court should ignore the absence of any allegations of ineffective assistance and read
those such claims into his petition.

(Id.) It is clear, though, that O’Neil knows perfectly well

how to allege ineffective assistance of counsel. After his conviction in 2011 for grand theft by
possession of stolen property, O’Neil filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and motion
for appointment of counsel. O’Neil v. State, Opinion No. 40120, 2013 WL 6094343, at *1
(Idaho App. Nov. 20, 2013).

That petition was summarily dismissed, and his motion for

appointment of counsel denied, because his allegations were conclusory, though they asserted
ineffective of counsel. Id. at *5-6 (quoting O’Neil’s petition as alleging: “‘My counsel was
ineffective for entering into an agreement/stipulation for restitution without my knowledge or
consent.’”). This is not a case in which a pro se petitioner attempted to assert a claim for
ineffective assistance but failed to include some technical pleading requirement; it is a case in
which the petitioner made no attempt to assert the claim at all. For all O’Neil says in his petition,
his counsel might well have addressed Ms. Myler’s alleged bias against him and/or the
prosecution’s alleged “withholding” of evidence at the disposition hearing.
Next, for the reasons discussed above, even if the Court does read O’Neil’s petition as
somehow asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, such a claim is not possibly valid.
With respect to the allegation that his attorney was ineffective for failing to address the
“withholding” of information by the prosecutor, the only information allegedly withheld involves
the supposed inadequacies of Wood Court. (R., p. 21.) O’Neil’s own allegations reflect that his
attorney put on evidence regarding those alleged inadequacies. (R., p. 19.) Because O’Neil’s
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attorney presented evidence regarding the alleged inadequacies of Wood Court, he cannot be
ineffective for failing to ensure that those alleged inadequacies were before the district court.
As for the alleged misrepresentations by Ms. Myler, as well as her alleged “bias” against
O’Neil, any failure by his attorney to address them was a reasonable, tactical choice in light of
their irrelevance to the disposition hearing. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 447, 180 P.3d 476,
486 (2008) (holding that “[t]he decision to impeach a witness is a tactical decision,” as is “the
decision of what evidence should be introduced at trial,” resulting in a “‘strong presumption’ that
the decision fell within the acceptable range of choices available to trial counsel” (quoting State
v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999)). “This Court has long-adhered to
the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.” Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 172, 254
P.3d 69, 73 (Ct. App. 2011).
Again, O’Neil admitted that he violated his probation by testing positive for
methamphetamine on six occasions, by using drugs, by missing at least one appointment for drug
testing, and by being discharged from the Bannock County Diversionary Court as a result. (R.,
pp. 57, 62.) The district court based its determination to revoke his probation and re-instate his
underlying sentence on those admissions (R., p. 63), which decision the Court of Appeals
affirmed, State v. O’Neil, Unpublished Opinion No. 640 (Idaho App. Nov. 8, 2017). None of the
alleged misrepresentations, nor the vague allegation that Ms. Myler was biased against O’Neil, in
any way cast doubt on those admissions or mitigate the admitted probation violations.
Assuming, though O’Neil does not allege, that O’Neil’s attorney was aware of the alleged
misrepresentations and of O’Neil’s view that Ms. Myler had a “bias” against him, but chose not
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to address them, that decision was squarely within the acceptable range of choices available. See
Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882, 887, 876 P.2d 164, 169 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that counsel was
not ineffective for failing to submit polygraph results at sentencing because the results were not
relevant to sentencing).
Finally, and for the same reasons, O’Neil cannot show that his counsel’s tactical decisions
were prejudicial, even if they were deficient. There is no reasonable probability that the district
court would have decided not to revoke O’Neil’s probation if only it had heard O’Neil’s vague
allegations that Ms. Myler was biased against him, that she made two misstatements entirely
unrelated to his probation violations in a document the court did not review, and that she made
only one appointment for him to establish his Social Security benefits rather than several. The
information is simply irrelevant to the probation revocation, which was based on O’Neil’s
admitted probation violations.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V . WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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